From a sample of 75,854 Slovenian fi rms in the period 1995-2011, we examine the effects of a fi rm's access to bank credit on its growth. The results suggest that as the external fi nancing constraint relaxes and fi rm gets access to credit, the reliance on internal funds to fi nance growth decreases. By exploring the role of available collateral in gaining access to bank credit, we fi nd that collateral only helps larger fi rms to obtain credit more easily. On the other hand, collateral does not reduce micro fi rms' dependence on internal funds to fi nance growth, which suggests that even if they have collateral, banks are still unprepared to fi nance them, possibly due to the level of risk. It could also be that in approving credit to micro fi rms, other factors such as liquidity or cash fl ow are more highly considered by banks than the value of collateral.
INTRODUCTION
According to the neoclassical fi nancial theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) , investment decisions of fi rms are not affected by their fi nancing decisions. If all fi rms have equal access to external fi nancing, their chosen mix between equity and debt is irrelevant in fi nancing fi rm's growth because external fi nancing provides a perfect substitute for internal funds. In reality, however, fi rms do not have equal access to external fi nancing sources due to the existing imperfections, which introduce a wedge between the costs of internal and external funds. In a survey among 1,050 CFOs from U.S., Europe and Asia, fi nd that during the global fi nancial crises in 2008, fi nancially-constrained fi rms planned deeper cuts in investment and were forced to burn a signifi cantly larger portion of their cash savings relative to unconstrained fi rms.
In this paper we explore the effects of a fi rm's access to bank credit on its potential for growth, taking a large sample of Slovenian fi rms. The results suggest that all fi rms, including micro fi rms, reduce their reliance on internal funds to fi nance growth once the external fi nancing constraint relaxes and fi rm is able to obtain credit or increase its level of indebtedness. On the other hand, collateral seems to alleviate the fi nancial constraint problem only for larger fi rms, but not for micro fi rms. There are two possible explanations for this fi nding. First, banks consider micro fi rms as too risky and are thus unprepared to fi nance them even if they have enough collateral. Second, in approving credit to micro fi rms banks could be more focused on other factors, such as the liquidity, cash fl ow or indebtedness position and not that much on collateral, as they are for larger fi rms.
This paper contributes to the existing literature related to fi nancial constraints. An extensive literature is available to test the presence and importance of fi nancial constraints with the sensitivity of investment to cash fl ow. In a classic study, Fazzari et al. (1988) fi nd that those fi rms that have the lowest dividend-to-income ratio are the most fi nancially constrained and show the highest investment cash fl ow sensitivity. This means that their investment decisions largely depend on the availability of internal funds. Even though this approach is widely used, it also has some limitations and is subject to some criticisms. Contrary to Fazzari's et al. (1998) conclusions, Erickson and Whited (2000) fi nd no evidence that cash fl ow belongs in the investment q regression, whether or not fi rms are fi nancially constrained. Moreover, their estimated cash fl ow sensitivities are lower for fi nancially constrained fi rms and in some cases also negative. Agca and Mozumdar (2008) and in a recent study Chen and Chen (2012) show that there has been a steady decrease in investment cash fl ow sensitivity over time and it has completely disappeared in recent years. Chen and Chen (2012) point out that if one believes that fi nancial constraints have not disappeared, then investment cash fl ow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of fi nancial constraints. For this reason, researchers started looking for alternative ways to explain why some fi rms face more obstacles in obtaining external fi nancing sources. Sufi (2009) provides evidence that access to lines of credit as a measure of fi nancial constraints adds valuable information to investment cash fl ow sensitivity. A similar measure is used by Rahaman (2011) who shows that, as the external fi nancing constraint is alleviated, a fi rm relies less on internal funds and switches to external fi nancing as the primary source for fi nancing growth.
Our paper extends the fi ndings of Rahaman (2011) by adding the role of collateral in alleviating the problem of external fi nancing constraint. We fi nd, for larger fi rms, that as their collateral increases, the incremental effect of internal funds on the fi rm's growth decreases, which suggests that with higher amounts of collateral, they are able to obtain external funds more easily and thus reduce their dependence on internal funds. On the other hand, collateral seems useless for micro fi rms and does not help them to reduce their reliance on internal funds.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data, descriptive statistics, variable defi nitions and empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results with different measures of a fi rm's access to bank credit and robustness checks. Section 4 concludes the paper.
METHODOLOGY

Data, descriptive statistics and variable defi nition
We have drawn a sample of fi rms from the database of the Republic of Slovenia's Agency for Public Legal Records and Related Services (AJPES). It contains fi nancial data compiled from balance sheets and income statements of Slovenian legal entities. Sole traders are not included. We use annual data for the period 1995-2011, which is suffi cient to observe the growth of fi rms over the business cycle. Without imposing any restrictions on the data, our sample contains 729,858 observations for 92,733 different fi rms, of which 17.4% are represented in all 17 years. Firms with negative equity are excluded from the sample, because these fi rms do not usually have any potential for growth. Additionally we also exclude fi rms which reported zero assets or zero turnover, since these are our primary variables of interest. After these restrictions, we are left with 547,945 observations for 75,854 different fi rms.
We focus on micro fi rms because many papers found small fi rms to be more fi nancially constrained. Banks are not willing to fi nance them because they represent a high credit risk. In accordance with the theory of fi nancial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1996) small fi rms experience substantially more pro-cyclical variation in sales because their access to credit is signifi cantly constrained when the recession hits. Similarly, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Campello and Chen (2010) argue small fi rms are less diversifi ed, more opaque and experience lower access to external fi nancing in adverse macro-economic shocks. In addition to the view that smaller fi rms hardly ever get credit, Han et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2011) fi nd that small fi rms are also less likely to apply for credit due to high interest rates and collateral requirements.
Consistent with this view, we divide our sample into micro and other fi rms using our own system of classifi cation. Micro fi rms are those that fulfi ll two out of the following three criteria: (1) Total assets under EUR 50,000, (2) Total turnover under EUR 50,000, (3) Average number of employees during the business year does not exceed 6. Using these criteria, 24,882 fi rms are classifi ed as micro fi rms and represent 20% of all observations in our sample. Table 1 reports summary statistics for fi rms' growth, fi nancing sources and other characteristics of the fi rms. The main dependent variable which interests us is the growth of the fi rm. We use a fi rm's i total turnover growth as a measure for its growth which is constructed as Δlog(Total turnover) it = log(Total turnover) it -log(Total turnover) it-1 . However, for robustness checks, we use total assets growth as an alternative defi nition. The dynamics of a fi rm's growth is notably infl uenced by the fi rm's size and age. Micro fi rms are on average younger and less experienced and their resources are more constrained relative to others. Micro fi rms are, therefore, more vulnerable in a turbulent environment, especially in macroeconomic downturns or with payment indiscipline.
As empirical literature indicates, the access to external fi nancing sources signifi cantly affects a fi rm's growth. Due to limited access to external sources, micro fi rms have to accumulate more internal funds in order to fi nance their growth (Rahaman, 2011) . As can be seen in Table 1 , internal funds are a much more important source of fi nancing for micro fi rms, compared to larger fi rms. The capital-to-assets ratio is equal to 60% for micro fi rms, whereas it is 42% for other fi rms.
To measure a fi rm's access to external fi nancing, we follow fi ndings of Sufi (2009) who argues, that the degree of access to bank credit facilities is a better measure of a fi rm's external fi nancing constraints than the traditional investment cash fl ow sensitivity measure. For this reason, we use different measures to indicate a fi rm's ability to obtain bank credit.
Firstly, Firm has credit is equal to 1 if the fi rm i is indebted to at least one bank and is 0 otherwise. Only 15% of micro fi rms have loans, which suggests that in general they are signifi cantly more fi nancially-constrained than larger fi rms, of which 57% have loans. Smaller fi rms represent a higher credit risk and thus have more problems in obtaining bank loans. Moreover, as Han et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2011) fi nd, smaller fi rms are also discouraged from applying for credit due to asymmetric information, which makes them more risky and increases the costs of borrowing.
Secondly, Firm has long-term loan is equal to 1 if the fi rm i has a long-term loan and 0 if it only has short-term loans. This measure is calculated only for fi rms which are indebted to at least one bank. The motivation for using it is that fi rms' investment projects are usually fi nanced with long-term credit, so we can expect those fi rms with more long-term loans among their liabilities to grow faster. Micro fi rms are more fi nancially constrained also from this perspective since only 27% have access to long-term bank credit. We use this measure as a robustness check. Notes: "Firm has loan" is equal 1 if a fi rm has credit and zero otherwise, "Firm has long-term loan" is equal 1 if a fi rm has long-term loans credit and zero if it has short-term loans only, "Available collateral" is defi ned as tangible assets (including investment property)/total assets, "leverage" is defi ned as long-term debt/total assets.
Source: AJPES, own calculations.
Thirdly, Credit to assets, which is defi ned as the sum of short-term and long-term credit over total assets. Like Firm has long-term credit, it is calculated only for fi rms which have credit. Results in Table 1 suggest, that if micro fi rms have access to credit, they borrow to a higher degree of indebtedness than larger fi rms. A similar measure of fi nancial constraints is also used by Rahaman (2011) who fi nds that once the external fi nancing constraint is alleviated, the fi rm relies less on internal funds and switches to external fi nancing as its primary source for fi nancing growth.
Fourthly, Available collateral, which is defi ned as tangible assets (including investment property) in fi rm's total assets. Higher values of collateral may help fi rms to overcome the problem of asymmetric information and obtain credit more easily (Chava and Purnanadam, 2011) . In addition to being worse risks, Table 1 indicates micro fi rms also have lower proportion of available collateral (7pp lower than larger fi rms), which could put them in a challenging position in obtaining credit.
Empirical strategy
The empirical model that we estimate has the following specifi cation:
where Y it is the growth of fi rm i between period t and t-1 which is approximated by total turnover growth, X it is the vector of fi rm specifi c variables measuring size, age, leverage, available
collateral, different sources of fi nancing and interaction effects between internal funds and fi rm's ability to obtain external fi nancing, η i is unobserved fi rm-specifi c effect and ε it is the error term.
Estimating dynamic panel data model leads to several econometric problems. As summarized by Bond (2002) the OLS estimator is inconsistent due to the correlation between Y it-1 and individual specifi c effect η i and this correlation does not disappear as the number of observations in the sample gets larger. A similar point also holds for the random effects estimator which, like OLS, does not eliminate η i . The within estimator eliminates this source of endogeneity by subtracting the individual means for each fi rm i. Since η i is time invariant it is removed from the transformed equation. However, the endogeneity problem still remains, since within transformed lagged dependent variable (
First differencing transformation also eliminates the individual effects η i from the model
but cause the correlation between lagged dependent variable (Y it-1 -Y it-2 ) and (ε it -ε it-1 ). Since fi rst differencing does not introduce all realizations of the errors into Δε it , this problem can be solved using instrumental variables that are correlated with ΔY it-1 and orthogonal to Δε it . Arellano and Bond (1991) derive a consistent GMM estimator using lagged levels (Y i1 ,Y i2 ,…,Y iT-2 ) as instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998) fi nd that lagged level instruments may become weak as the autoregressive process becomes too persistent or the ratio of the variance of fi rm-level effects η i to the variance of the error ε it becomes too large. They develop an approach outlined in Arellano and Bover (1995) where in addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation they also use moment conditions in which lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation. This so-called system-GMM model can be estimated if instrumental variables are uncorrelated with individual specifi c effects η i . We believe that the Blundell-Bond approach is more suitable for our model since it also enables us to include time invariant regressors like sector dummies which capture different growth potentials across sectors. Moreover, system GMM estimator is more robust for unbalanced panels since lagged observations enter the equation as instruments instead of explicitly as regressors. However, we also estimate the Arellano-Bond model for a robustness check.
As recommended by Roodman (2006) , time dummies are included in the models. This helps to fulfi ll the assumption of no correlation in idiosyncratic disturbances. In the two-step GMM estimator, standard errors tend to be too small, for this reason we use variance correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) . We report two diagnostic tests: First, the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions which tests for the validity of instruments. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies the instruments do not satisfy orthogonality conditions. Second, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in residuals. First-order serial correlation in differences is always present since (ε it -ε it-1 ) is related to (ε it-1 -ε it-2 ). To check for fi rst-order serial correlation in levels we look for second-order serial correlation AR(2) in differences. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates autocorrelation in residuals.
RESULTS
This section reports estimated impacts of various fi rm characteristics and fi nancing sources on fi rms' growth. Results are divided into three parts. First, a binary variable Firm has credit is used as an indicator for fi rm's access to credit. Second, we focus only on fi rms that have credit and check how level of indebtedness to banks, which is measured with Credit to assets, infl uences their growth. Third, we make several robustness checks with alternative estimator, alternative defi nitions of variables and estimation on a subsample of fi rms. Similar as Rahaman (2011), we include interaction effects between internal funds and access to external fi nancing sources to check if the importance of internal funds for fi rm growth decreases once the external fi nancing constraint is alleviated. Since smaller fi rms are more fi nancially constraint and rely more on internal funds, we estimate these effects separately for micro and other fi rms. In interpreting the results we focus on the role of different fi nancing sources for fi rms' growth.
Access to credit and growth of the fi rm
In Table 2 we present the results separately for all fi rms, micro fi rms and other fi rms. Internal funds growth, which is defi ned as log(Owner's equity) it -log(Owner's equity) it-1 , has positive and highly statistically signifi cant effect on fi rm growth for all three subsamples of fi rms. This interpretation holds irrespective of the values of Available collateral and Firm has credit which are interacted with Δlog(Internal fund) it . Internal sources can be directly used to fi nance new projects, so higher accumulation of internal funds allows fi rms to obtain higher growth rates. In addition, Almeida and Campello (2010) and Sufi (2009) fi nd that higher level of internal funds also increases fi rm's access to external fi nancing sources, which can have an additional positive effect on growth.
The importance of internal funds for fi rm growth is more pronounced for micro fi rms. Smaller fi rms may have diffi culties in obtaining bank credit because they are less diversifi ed and represent higher credit risk to lenders. This external fi nancing constraint problem further increases in recession, when banks switch to better quality borrowers (Bernanke et al., 1996) . For this reason, smaller fi rms have to rely more on internal funds to fi nance new projects. Since outside sources of fi nancing are less available for smaller fi rms, they are also more careful with allocating funds and invest more to highly effi cient segments (Hovakimian, 2011) .
Collateral that fi rms possess can help them to alleviate the fi nancial constraint problem and obtain external funds more easily. In empirical specifi cations (1), (3) and (5) we include interaction terms between Internal funds growth and Available collateral. The effect is negative, meaning that higher values of collateral reduce the effect of internal funds on fi rm growth. This suggests that with higher values of collateral fi rms can obtain credit more easily and thus reduce their dependence on internal funds to fi nance growth. While this effect is highly statistically signifi cant for all fi rm and other fi rms it is not signifi cant for micro fi rms. This means that collateral doesn't help micro fi rms to reduce their dependence on internal funds. A possible reason for this is that even if they have collateral, banks are still unprepared to fi nance them due to the level of risk they pose. In the case of a default, bank would need to seize these assets and sell them at current market prices, which is costly and exposes the bank to market risk, so they prefer to give credit to fi rms with a lower probability of default. The reason could also be that in approving credit to micro fi rms, banks are more focused on other factors, such as liquidity, cash fl ow or indebtedness position and not that much on the collateral.
In specifi cations (2), (4) and (6) we include interaction effects between internal funds growth and binary variable which is equal to 1 if fi rm has credit. The effect is negative and highly statistically signifi cant for all sub-samples of fi rms and suggests that as the external fi nancing constraint is alleviated, the effect of internal fi nancing on fi rm growth decreases. Once fi rms get access to bank credit they rely less on internal funds to fi nance new investment projects. This result is consistent with Rahaman (2011) who uses Short-term bank loans and overdrafts/Total liabilities as a measure of fi rm's access to bank credit facility. We use a similar measure in the following section. (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes: All the models are estimated with the Blundell-Bond (1998) system-GMM estimator for the period 1995-2011. The dependent variable in the regressions is the fi rm's i total turnover growth, calculated as Δlog(Total turnover) it . "Total assets" is the book value of the fi rms' assets from the balance sheet, "Age" is the age of the fi rm in years, "Leverage" is defi ned as Long-term debt/Total assets, "Available collateral" is defi ned as Tangible assets (including investment property)/Total assets, "Internal fund" is defi ned as Owner's equity, "Firm has credit" is equal 1 if fi rm has credit and zero otherwise. We control for time and sector effects.
These results build on the fi ndings of Rahaman (2011) by showing the role of collateral to overcome the fi nancial constraint problem. All the fi rms, including micro fi rms, reduce their reliance on internal fi nancing sources to fi nance growth once they are able to obtain credit. On the other hand, collateral which serves to alleviate the fi nancial constraint problem, seems useful only for larger fi rms, but not for micro fi rms. Even if they have collateral, it does not reduce the effect of internal funds on fi rm growth. This suggests that banks are probably prepared to fi nance micro fi rms only if they have persuasive investment projects with suffi cient future cash fl ows, enough liquidity and low probability of default.
Access to credit and fi rm growth: The level of indebtedness to banks
In Table 3 we present estimated models in which instead of binary variable Firm has credit to measure fi rm's access to bank credit, we now use the level of indebtedness to banks -Credit to assets. All these models are estimated only for fi rms that are indebted to at least one bank, for this reason, the number of observations is considerably lower comparing to results in Table 2 . We exclude control variable Leverage since it is highly correlated with Credit to assets.
The proportion of credit in fi rm's assets has positive and highly statistically signifi cant effect on fi rm growth. Higher fi nancial leverage allows fi rms to invest more and thus grow faster. If fi rms are not able to obtain enough credit, they have to rely more on internal funds to fi nance new projects, which may represent a growth constraint when they are unable to provide enough internal funds to fi nance new investment projects. The effect of Credit to assets on growth is signifi cantly larger for micro fi rms. Since it is much more diffi cult for micro fi rms to obtain credit, they use it as effi ciently as possible once they get it and invest in high profi table projects.
Table3
Access to credit and fi rm growth: The level of indebtedness to banks Blundell-Bond (1998) system-GMM estimator for the period 1995-2011. The dependent variable in the regressions is the fi rm's i total turnover growth, calculated as Δlog(Total turnover) it . "Total assets" is the book value of the fi rms' assets from the balance sheet, "Age" is the age of the fi rm in years, "Available collateral" is defi ned as Tangible assets (including investment property)/Total assets, "Credit to assets" is defi ned as All liabilities to banks/Total assets, "Internal fund" is defi ned as Owner's equity. In all the estimates we control for time and sector effects.
The interaction term between Internal funds growth and Credit to assets is negative and consistent with Rahaman (2011) . This result shows that as the external fi nancing constraint relaxes and a fi rm is able to obtain more credit, the incremental effect of internal fi nancing on fi rm growth decreases. Although signifi cant only at 10% level, this effect is substantially more important for micro fi rms. These fi rms are more likely to be more fi nancially constrained, so once they are able to increase indebtedness to banks, they reduce reliance on internal funds to a much greater extent than larger fi rms.
Empirical specifi cation (3) confi rms again that collateral does not help micro fi rms to achieve higher growth rates. The coeffi cient of Available collateral and its interaction with Internal funds growth are both statistically insignifi cant. As in the previous section, this suggests that even if they have collateral, they cannot reduce their reliance on internal funds to fi nance growth.
Robustness checks
In this section we show that our results are robust to different model specifi cations. We perform four robustness checks:
First, instead of the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator we apply the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator. This model is estimated only in differences, so sector dummies, which are time invariant are now dropped from the estimation. Another consequence of differences is that we lose approximately 50.000 observations. We use the same model specifi cation as before, with one lag of the dependent variable and the same number of instruments. The signs of all the coeffi cients are the same as with the Blundell-Bond estimator. Also the magnitude of coeffi cients is very similar. All the models also fulfi ll the Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in residuals. Thus, our results are robust to alternative estimator.
Second, we restrict our dependent variable between 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution. Our results could be driven by outliers with large negative or large positive growth rate, so we drop all the observations at the 1st and 100th percentile of the distribution of total turnover growth. By doing this we lose approximately 5,000 observations. The signs of coeffi cients do not change and magnitudes are also similar to before. The only change is that with the same specifi cations as presented in the text, some models do not pass the autocorrelation test. Since our original models pass all the tests and give actually the same results as models with excluded outliers, we conclude that our fi ndings are not driven by outliers.
Third, we use an indicator if Firm has long-term credit instead of Firm has credit. The motivation for this is that long-term credit represents more stable source of fi nancing and fi rms usually fi nance investment projects with long-term debt. For this reason, we construct a binary variable, which is equal 1 if fi rm has long-term credit and is zero if fi rm only has short-term credit. All these models are estimated only for the fi rms that are indebted to at least one bank. Using Firm has long-term credit instead of Firm has credit does not change our conclusions. As in the previous results, we fi nd that collateral can help to alleviate the fi nancial constraint problem of larger fi rms, but not for micro fi rms.
Fourth, we use Total assets growth as a measure of fi rm growth. Instead of log(Total assets) it as a measure for fi rm size, we now use log(Total turnover) it . The magnitudes of the coeffi cients are now changed due to the different defi nition of the dependent variable, but the signs of coeffi cients are still the same, which suggests that our results are robust to different specifi cation of dependent variable.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we focus on the question: How a fi rm's access to bank credit affects its growth? We explore how the availability of bank credit infl uences fi rms' dependence on internal funds to fi nance their growth. The literature reports that the dependence of investment on cash fl ow has vanished (Chen and Chen, 2012) and that the access to bank credit facility is more powerful measure of fi nancial constraint (Sufi , 2009) . Therefore, we use a variety of variables, which indicate the fi rm's ability to obtain credit. Among them, we particularly focus on available collateral, which is used by banks to hedge themselves in case of a debtor's default. It also deepens the understanding of different fi rms' investment behaviour. By adding the role of collateral, this paper extends the fi ndings of Rahaman (2011) .
On a sample of 75,854 Slovenian fi rms over the last 17 years, we fi nd, as do others, that greater availability of external sources of funding reduces fi rms' dependence on internal resources. Firms, which can overcome the fi nancial constraint problem and can access bank credit, are less dependent on internal funds and are able to achieve higher growth rates. Collateral, which serves to alleviate the fi nancial constraint problem, seems useful only for larger fi rms. Once they have a suffi cient amount of collateral they can obtain more credit and thus reduce dependence on internal funds. On the other hand, collateral does not help micro fi rms to reduce their dependence on internal funds, which suggests that collateral does not help them in obtaining credit. This could be due to the high probability of their default, which makes them too risky for banks to be willing to advance credit even if they have enough collateral to pledge, or due to the banks giving more consideration to other factors in granting credit to micro fi rms, factors such as liquidity or cashfl ow position.
